Introduction
The digital economy forms a central driver to future prosperity -delivering waves of innovation, efficiencies and consumer welfare. It has revolutionised business models, products, services, communications and social interactions. Digitalisation has also stimulated a shift in market dynamics, paving the way for the emergence of key platforms, networks and the proliferation of multi-sided markets.
In a rapidly changing economic landscape, the growth and evolution of the digital economy raise competition enforcement challenges at two distinct levels. First, at the practical level, enforcers must confront the added complexity of conducting their assessments in a dynamic environment. The changing economic landscape brings with it inevitable uncertainty as to the nature of competitive pressures, the ability of markets to self-correct, likely harm, efficiencies, and disruptive innovation. Second, at the policy level, new competition dynamics in the digital economy raise questions as to the normative scope of competition enforcement. The question -'Is this a competition problem?' -has become common in the face of new business strategies, new forms of interaction with consumers, the accumulation of data and the use of big analytics. Indeed, new market realities and business strategies raise questions as to the optimal use of competition law, its effectiveness, and more broadly, its goals. This paper focuses on the latter challenge and seeks to outline the scope of EU competition law -its purpose and values. While doing so, it considers how EU competition law should be applied to digital markets. Clarifying these norms provides the legal prism through which to view the market dynamics. It affects one's conclusion as to the nature of activities that competition law can address under European law, and what constitutes an infringement of the law.
The paper begins with a brief introduction of the foundations of European competition law. Following this, it considers the multitude of goals and values that European competition law aims to advance, and their significance in a digitalised economy. The discussion then moves on to explore the tension between the multitude of goals and economic analysis. It then further reflects on the difference in scope between US antitrust law and the limitations of convergence.
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The multitude of competition goals, and their position within the wider normative EU values, is undoubtedly challenging, in particular when considered alongside the desire to engage in economic based analysis. As will be explained further below, to the most part, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission have developed the core goals of EU competition law in a consistent manner, utilising economic analysis to optimise intervention within the boundaries set by the Treaty provisions.
II -Key Competition Goals and Values
This section outlines the key goals and values of European Competition law -its unique DNA. The objectives, together, represent the ethos of competition law in Europe. As alluded above, this diversity is not without challenge or controversy. The various goals have not always been clearly outlined. They represent an amalgamation of values which often overlap but may also reveal friction. Indeed, their implementation calls for trade-offs between norms and may result in varying balancing points and ambiguity. 18 It is with this pluralism in mind that this section seeks to highlight the complementary and interdependent nature of many of these goals and values, and the way in which they form a coherent whole.
The goals of European Competition law centre around, and are primarily consistent, with consumer welfare, but are not limited to it. Without attempting to imply a hierarchy between the other values and goals, this multitude is illustrated below:
11 Art 8 TFEU. 12 Art 12 TFEU; Art 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202/389 (hereinafter 'the Charter'). 13 Art 9 TFEU refers to 'the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.' 14 Art 168(1) TFEU; Article 35 Charter. 15 Articles 11 TFEU; Article 37 Charter; Julian Nowag Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-Movement Laws (Oxford University Press 2016) 16 Ford/Volkswagen (Case IV/33.814) Commission Decision 93/49/EEC [1993] OJ L 20/14, para 36: 'In the assessment of this case, the Commission also takes note of the fact that the project constitutes the largest ever single foreign investment in Portugal. It is estimated to lead, inter alia, to the creation of about 5 000 jobs and indirectly create up to another 10000 jobs, as well as attracting other investment in the supply industry. It therefore contributes to the promotion of the harmonious development of the Community and the reduction of regional disparities which is one of the basic aims of the Treaty.' See also para 23 where it is stated that when considering an exemption under Article 101(3) the Commission took into account these 'extremely positive effects on the infrastructure and employment in one of the poorest regions in the Community. 
Consumer well-being and consumer welfare
The promotion of consumer well-being and the prevention of consumer harm have long been established as the prime goals of competition law. As noted by the General Court: The Court of Justice has clarified that consumer well-being may be harmed both directly and indirectly, holding that the competition provisions cover 'not only those practices that directly cause harm to consumers but also practices that cause consumers harm through their impact on competition.'
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The term 'well-being', which is referred to in Article 3(1) TEU and in the case law, embodies somewhat abstract normative properties. With this in mind, the European Commission has made use of the term 'consumer welfare' and introduced it into the European Jurisprudence. 21 Reflecting on the decision to utilise the term 'consumer welfare', Mario Monti, former European Commissioner, commented on it being driven, to some extent, by the desire to more clearly delineate the scope of competition provisions. 22 The overlap between the two terms is evident, as the normative concept of well-being encompasses the more narrow, economically oriented, concept of consumer welfare. Importantly, while the concept of consumer welfare hints toward a clearer economic benchmark, it does not embody universally agreed properties. 23 Different views exist, as to its scope, measurement and the means to promote it. 24 The European Commission elaborates, in its guidelines, on the role of the consumer welfare standard. In the context of Article 101 TFEU, it notes that '[t]he aim of the Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.' 25 Similarly, in the context of Article 102 TFEU, the Commission notes that its enforcement activity aims to prevent 'an adverse impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice.' 26 Consumer well-being and welfare provide the core rationale at the heart of European competition law and identify the prime beneficiaries of the competitive process. In an attempt to transform these goals into workable benchmarks, competition authorities have often approximated them through the use of the consumer surplus benchmark. 27 Importantly, one should note the potential discrepancy between the abstract goal of well-being, the concept of consumer welfare, and the narrower economic benchmarks of consumer surplus used to approximate them. Being static in nature, the latter may only partially reflect the full spectrum of welfare effects.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the consumer welfare and well-being benchmarks provide a central pillar for intervention in digital markets. They may be used to address exclusionary practices, exploitation, agreements with the object or the effect of restricting competition, and concentrations. Furthermore, they may provide a prism through which one may consider wider effects which may harm consumer interests.
In the context of the digital economy, noteworthy are the following points: 
Effective competition structure
In addition to the core focus on consumer welfare, European jurisprudence has emphasised the goal of maintaining an effective competitive structure. While the two goals often overlap, the focus on competition structure provides a supplementary nuanced prism. The European Courts have long held that competition law 'is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure.'
31 In T-Mobile, the Court of Justice elaborated that European competition law 'is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.' 32 The Court added that a 'concerted practice may be regarded as having an anti-competitive object even though there is no direct connection between that practice and consumer prices. 33 Similarly, in her opinion in this case, Advocate General Kokott noted that the protection of the structure of the market indirectly also protects consumers ' [b] The protection of an 'effective competition structure' provides for a wider prism than that reflected by the consumer welfare benchmark. It draws attention to the competitive process as such and has led to the condemnation of conducts that impair genuine undistorted competition.
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In the context of Article 102 TFEU, the protection of the effective competition structure has resulted in the imposition of a special responsibility on dominant firms not to distort competition on the market, 40 limit the buyer's freedom as regards choice of sources of supply, or bar competitors from access to the market. 41 In the context of Article 101 TFEU, the protection of the effective competition supports the view that 'in order to find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice and consumer prices.'
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Flowing from the protection of an 'effective competition structure' is the protection of input providers. Article 102 TFEU unambiguously indicates that an unlawful abuse may result from, among other things, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase prices, or other unfair trading conditions. Similarly, Article 101(1) TFEU refers to the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices. In its decisional practice, 43 the Commission noted that the purchase price is a fundamental aspect of competitive conduct. 44 The focus on the supply side of the market was also noted by Advocate General Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, 45 where he pointed to the fact that buyer cartels may 'suppress the price of purchased products to below the competitive level, with negative consequences for the supply side of the relevant market.' 46 Overall, the explicit reference to purchase prices has served as a backbone to the assertion that European competition law is also concerned with upstream effects.
In the context of the digital economy, the wider prism offered by the protection of an 'effective competition structure' has significant implications.
First, it offers an independent mandate for intervention, detached from direct effect on consumers. It enables the competition agency and courts to pre-empt by challenging actions that distort competition on digital markets. This does not necessarily imply more aggressive enforcement, rather a wider, and arguably more effective, consideration of effects on the digital landscape. [1983] ECR 3461, para 57, holding that the dominant undertaking has a 'special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market'. 41 In Post Danmark (n 20), para 26, the Court of Justice held that '[i]n order to determine whether a dominant undertaking has abused its dominant position by its pricing practices, it is necessary to consider all the circumstances and to examine whether those practices tend to remove or restrict the buyer's freedom as regards choice of sources of supply, to bar competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting competition' (case law omitted). 42 T-Mobile (n 7), para 39. Second, is the focus on the effects online platforms, intermediaries and other economic actors have on the process of competition. Of particular significance is the subrogation of the dominant firm's economic self-interests to its responsibility not to distort competition. While it is widely accepted that 'not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition', 47 unjustified distortions may trigger intervention.
Third, the focus on the competitive process draws attention to the potential use of networks, platforms or data pools as possible barriers to entry or expansion or as a mechanism to raise rivals' costs. The increased significance of data in shaping markets and influencing their development, highlight it being a relevant parameter in the assessment of markets and possible distortion of competition. 48 Fourth, 'effective competition structure' draws attention to the consideration of choice in the digital world. It may be used to appraise dominant players' ability to increase friction and use manipulation to limit consumer choice while maintaining a façade of abundance. 49 Similarly, it provides a relevant intervention benchmarks when dominant firms limit access of competitors through tying practices, 50 or reduced interoperability.
Fifth, the consideration of upstream effects could offer a fresh perspective on how bottleneck digital players can impact the viability of input providers through practices that may negatively affect upstream, but also downstream markets and thus end consumers.
Sixth, the focus on the process of competition has a functional role beyond specific violations, as a tool which supports undistorted innovation in digital markets. 51 Competition agencies should look at the effects various strategies may have on the nature and scale of innovation, and the incentives and ability to bring new products, processes and services to the market.
Efficiencies and innovation
Efficient allocation of resources for the benefit of consumers is an important facet of competition policy. 52 Indeed, competition law enforcement strives to ensure that 'markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition between undertakings.' 'When Article 102 TFEU is seen against that background, it is sensible to use that provision to try to protect the competitive process as a value in and of itself. If innovation by its nature cannot be predicted by the authorities, and cannot even reliably be produced by the most skilled and focused firms, the best that competition policy can realistically achieve is to maximize the innovation rate by ensuring that potentially innovative firms deploy their efforts.' 52 General Guidelines (n 6), para13; Guidance Paper (n 9) paras 1 ,5-7; Vertical Restraints Guidelines (n 9), para 7. 53 Guidance Paper (n 9), para 5.
Although the scope and measurement of efficiency gains may be subjected to varying approaches, 54 a consensus exists as to their central role in the competitive assessment. 55 Efficiencies play a significant role in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In this context, the Commission has stated that the objective of Article 101 TFEU is to protect competition on the market, among other things, as a means of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. 56 The role of efficiencies is also acknowledged under Article 102 TFEU as they may buttress potential justifications for otherwise abusive conduct. Indeed, as clarified by both the Commission and Union Courts, a dominant undertaking may justify conduct leading to foreclosure of competitors 'on the ground of efficiencies that are sufficient to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely to arise.' 57 Finally, in its appraisal of concentrations, the Commission also considers substantiated efficiency claims in the overall assessment of the merger. In particular, it examines whether efficiencies would counteract the harmful effects on both competition and consumers which might otherwise result from the transaction. 58 Promoting economic efficiencies as part of the application of EU competition law echoes the philosophy of neoclassical and neoliberal economics. Importantly, however, while of central significance in EU competition law, efficiency considerations are entwined with the promotion of consumer welfare and conditioned on consumers benefiting from them.
59 As such, they feed of the consumer welfare and wellbeing benchmarks. Such is the case in merger control where efficiencies may be considered, provided they 'counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers.' 60 'Efficiencies should be substantial and timely, and should, in principle, benefit consumers in those relevant markets where it is otherwise likely that competition concerns would occur.' 61 Similarly, under Articles 101(3) and 102 TFEU respectively, 'consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits,' and 'anticompetitive effects may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by efficiencies which also benefit the customers.'
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The focus on consumers underscores the distribution ethos of European competition law (discussed further below). The imperative mandating a 'fair share for consumers' implies that total efficiency (or total welfare) gives way to, and embodies, consumer welfare and surplus benchmarks. Importantly, this normative position may be at odds with those who favour an antitrust regime which disregards wealth distribution, 63 or those who believe antitrust enforcement should solely promote efficiency. In the context of the digital economy, of significance has been the treatment of dynamic efficiencies -that is, innovation -which characterise many digital markets. Innovation processes stimulate dynamic markets, enhance consumer welfare, and may help offset otherwise diminishing marginal returns. As a key driver of competition in, but also for markets, innovation should be safeguarded and promoted. Clearly, competition law has a role to play in fostering competition in innovation 65 by supporting the free market system, and by creating conditions conducive to efficiency maximisation, market integrity, and competition on the merits. 66 Ultimately, how one goes about supporting innovation may depend on one's affinity to either the Schumpeterian, 67 or Arrowian assumption, 68 to the inverted-U relationship model, 69 or other benchmarks.
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The challenge for enforcement in the digital age pertains to the difficulties in apprehending dynamic changes. In the digital world, methodological limitations may undermine one's capacity to clearly identify the effects of certain behaviours on innovation. Given the nature of dynamic efficiencies and the uncertainty surrounding disruptive innovation, whether competition law can provide an effective tool to ensure competition for future markets (innovation for markets) remains unclear. 71 Also challenging is the ability to differentiate between pro-consumer and negative innovation. 72 Indeed, in a digitalised environment, the distinction between research and development that promotes the consumer interest, from innovation that is used to develop exploitative technology or harmful exclusionary effects becomes, at times, blurred.
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The unpredictable nature of innovation calls for cautious intervention. The scope of markets and products, existing and potential competition, the nature of competition, as well as the likely future players may change with new waves of innovation. This dynamism supports the protection of the competitive process (discussed above) as an independent value, for the sake of, and focus on, innovation and future efficiencies.
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In the case of merger review, the risk that ex-ante intervention may chill innovation has led some to call for a more laissez-faire approach. 75 On the other hand, risks associated with large networks, data pools, platforms and their impact on competing innovators, adjacent markets, market entry, elimination of potential competition and the tipping of the market in favour of the merged entity, have led others to call for greater scrutiny. 65 European Commission, 'Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements' [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras 119-122 (hereinafter 'the Horizontal Agreements Guidelines'). 66 Roger Alford, 'The Role of Antitrust in Promoting Innovation' (2018) Speech delivered at Kings College London < https://goo.gl/kcqtMQ > accessed 30 March 2018. 67 According to the Schumpeterian hypothesis market concentration is understood to allow internalization of the rewards flowing from innovation efforts (increase monopoly rents). It therefore supports "creative destruction" -that is, the dynamic process in which new technologies replace the old. This hypothesis has often been viewed as establishing a negative correlation between competition and innovation; Josef Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (4th edn, George Allen & Unwin 1954). 68 The Arrowian hypothesis suggests that competitive pressure forms the key to investment in innovation, and that significant market power disincentivizes investment in further innovation. Accordingly, competition is viewed as a necessary pressure since a monopoly would likely under-invest in new technologies (or only invest when it generates additional profits); Kenneth J Arrow, Economic, 'Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention' in Richard Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social Factors (NBER Books 1962). 69 The inverted U-shaped relationship suggests that an increase in competition (from an initial low position) increases the rate of innovation, but high levels of competition decrease the rate of innovation. Competition may increase the incremental profit from innovating (the "escape-competition effect") but may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards 
Fairness
The concept of fairness echoes a moral norm embodied in European Union competition rules. As noted above, the concept of fairness reflects on the interpretation of the concepts of consumer welfare and efficiency benchmarks, and serves to align them. Article 101(3) TFEU expressly refers to the concept of "fair share" as part of the individual exemption mechanism available to otherwise anticompetitive agreements. More specifically, this provision requires the passing-on of overall benefits to compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused by the restriction of competition.
76 Article 102 TFEU stipulates that abuses of market dominance may be borne from, among other things, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices, as well as by other unfair trading conditions. Fairness considerations have triggered intervention, alongside the consumer welfare value, in some cases involving exploitative prices imposed on consumers. 77 Another example may be found in the analysis of margin squeeze, where the unfairness of the spread between wholesale and retail prices is at issue. 78 Fairness, in this context, may be viewed as ensuring equal opportunities for as efficient competitors and the protection of consumers. It is used to guarantee the legitimate expectations of economic operators and consumers. 79 Importantly, fairness should not be confused with protection of competitors. It is well accepted that the competition dynamic may result in less efficient undertakings being pushed out of the market and losing the contest. The value of fairness is not used to challenge such legitimate competition. 80 Beyond specific references in the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, fairness also serves as an abstract normative value which is promoted by the competitive process, 81 as well as ensuring a fair result of market outcomes. Fair competition cultivates trust in markets. It also crystallises legitimate expectations of market participants, and as such stimulates competition. 82 As noted by the Commission in its 2015 Report on Competition Policy:
[H]ealthy competition gives companies fair chances to do business and to achieve their commercial goals, which in turn encourages growth, job creation and prosperity. When companies are able to compete on their own merits, businesses and households benefit from a wide range of good quality, innovative products and services at competitive prices. 
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In 2016, the Commission opened its Report on Competition Policy, by stating that:
[C]ompetition policy has a direct impact on people's lives, and one of its key features is promoting open markets so that everyone -businesses and citizens -can get a fair share of the benefits of growth. 84
The 2016 Report makes reference to the 2016 State of the Union speech by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he stated that 'a fair playing field also means that in Europe, consumers are protected against cartels and abuses by powerful companies. (…) The Commission watches over this fairness. This is the social side of competition law. And this is what Europe stands for.' 85 Fairness has also been linked to innovation, as a facilitating norm which ensures a level playing field. For example, Advocate General Bot opined that:
[C]ompetition, if it is fair, generally ensures technological progress and improves the qualities of a service or product while ensuring a reduction in costs. It therefore benefits consumers because they can also benefit from products and services of better quality at a better price. In that way competition is a source of progress and development. 86
In its 'abstract' form, fairness is often seen as a guide, rather than a self-sufficient enforcement benchmark. In her Foreword to the 2016 Annual Competition Report, Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner for Competition, noted that: 'competition policy contributes to shaping a fairer society, where all economic players -large and small -abide by the same rules' and that 'in times of globalisation, we also need to ensure that a world of global trade, and global businesses, gives small business and individuals a fair chance.' 87 Importantly, Commissioner Vestager positioned the value within the overall competition enterprise and noted that while competition rules make markets work more fairly for consumers, unfairness, as such, does not automatically result in a violation of the competition rules. 88 Similarly, Director General Laitenberger noted that '[c]ompetition policy and enforcement can and do help instil a sense of fairness and equity in the economy and society at large.' 89 Furthermore, he opined that the concept of fairness 'is a way to express the overall goals and benefits of EU competition policy in a more tangible manner. It is not meant as a self-sufficient, generic legal test to be applied in cases. And certainly, the very concept of 'fairness' excludes that it substitutes rigorous, fact-based analysis.' The ultimate concern of antitrust law has always been protecting competition at all levels of the economy. Animating the beliefs of ordinary Americans who demand vigorous antitrust enforcement are the value of fairness and the belief that properly functioning competitive markets are themselves fair. To say it another way, competition is fair because it gives a chance to the small business owner to succeed in her business venture, because it delivers lower prices to consumers, and because it drives the innovation that improves products, business processes, and more. Competition among employers to attract workers is fair because it yields higher wages, better benefits, and safer working conditions. In general, competition is fair because it distributes these rewards broadly to participants in the economy. But when companies harm competition -choking off competition or agreeing with rivals not to compete -they infect the economy with unfairness by accumulating power that the few can wield at the expense of the broader American public. 14 legitimacy. 91 Economic reasoning is therefore fused into the norm of fairness. This notwithstanding, controversy remains as to the point of optimal fusion, with ranging views from enforcers, scholars, and businesses. Whichever stance one takes as to the interface between fairness and efficiency, one must crucially understand that fusion requires a balancing of values. In other words, the enterprise cannot be limited to an unreserved adoption of a norm-neutral economic approach. Doing so would divorce EU competition law from its constitutional roots and norms which include fairness. Non-efficiency objectives would thereby be expunged (rather than balanced with efficiency considerations), under the assumption that economic theory resolves normative concerns. Ultimately, such an approach would substitute democratic control with technocratic control.
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Embedded in the concept of fairness is the notion that competition law should be utilised to prevent unfair transfers of wealth. 93 Both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU include provisions which support distributional justice -targeting unfair selling or buying terms and prices. As illustrated above when discussing the consumer welfare standard, distributive justice arguments -though anchored in the Treaty -are not without controversy.
94 Indeed, some have questioned the wisdom and practicality of using competition law to promote fair distributions of wealth. 95 Such a function is claimed to be better served through taxation, thereby untangling the application of competition law from the need to conduct subjective value judgements. 96 Another related value which may be woven into the discussion of fairness is that of privacy. Privacy and data protection concerns, as such, are typically regarded as matters falling outside the scope of competition law enforcement and protected through dedicated laws.97 Yet, the role played by data and privacy in shaping markets increasingly supports their consideration as parameters in the competition assessment.98 In the context of fairness, this may give rise to concerns regarding possible data and privacy-related activities which have exploitative or exclusionary effects. Noteworthy in this respect is the Bundeskartellamt (The Federal Cartel Office, Germany) investigation against Facebook Inc., for alleged abuse of its dominant position in the market for social networks by imposing onerous conditions with respect to its data collection from users, in violation of data protection provisions.99 The case is anchored in national regulation and precedents,100 but nonetheless showcases the link between privacy and the control over data on one hand, and concepts of fairness, exploitation and abuse, on the other hand. '…any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law, they may be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.' 98 See comments by Isabelle de Silva referred to in note 48 above. See also comments by Margrethe Vestager referred to in note 48 above. 99 In a background information document (< https://bit.ly/2G1Viec > accessed 10 May 2018), the Bundeskartellamt elaborated on its theory of harm: 'If a dominant company makes the use of its service conditional upon the user granting the company extensive permission to use his or her personal data, this can be taken up by the competition authority as a case of "exploitative business terms". The use of exploitative business terms is a type of exploitative abuse under German competition law. With the provision on exploitative abuses the law aims to protect the opposite market side from being exploited by a dominant company. Such exploitation can take the form of excessive prices (price abuse) or unfair business terms (exploitative business terms). According to the case-law of the German Federal Court of Justice, civil law principles can also be applied to determine whether business terms are exploitative. On principle, any legal principle that aims to protect a contract party in an imbalanced negotiation position can be applied for this purpose. Often, such principles stem from the legislation on unfair contract terms or the German Basic Law. Following the Federal Court of Justice approach, the Bundeskartellamt also applies data protection principles in its assessment of Facebook's terms and conditions. In this regard, data protection law has the same objective as competition law, which is to protect individuals from having their personal data exploited by the opposite market side...' 100 The recently revised Section 18(3a) of the German Competition Act makes direct reference to personal data as a criterion relevant when establishing market power, especially in the case of online platforms and networks. Also note that according to the case-law of the German Federal Court of Justice, civil law principles can be applied to determine whether business terms are exploitative.
In the context of the digital economy, fairness could potentially play an important role.
First, as an abstract norm, it provides a guide to the nature of relations between online platforms, service providers and consumers. It may support intervention in view of unfair market practices, or when confronted with illegitimate transfers of wealth from consumers to service providers.
Second, and more specifically, it may serve to support intervention in cases of discriminatory practices by dominant online providers, especially when these lead to almost-perfect-price-discrimination (first degree price discrimination).
Third, it may be used to justify intervention when misleading information online facilitates or leads to distortion of competition.
Fourth, it may play a role when asymmetric information and asymmetric analytical capacity distort the relationship between users and service providers, and allow the latter to exploit users.
Fifth, it may play a role when data handling, data protection and privacy violations lead to distortions of competition or unfair exploitation.
Sixth, it may be used to establish a certain fiduciary duty which restrains the ability to make use of data and analytics about biases and preferences, or use data for other exploitative or exclusionary purposes.
Economic freedom, plurality and democracy
Economic plurality and freedom of choice are inherently linked to the quest for an effective competition structure. They reflect a societal agenda which seeks to promote the general public interest. As noted by the Court of Justice, among other things, competition rules 'prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest…' 101 Indeed, a competitive marketplace and freedom of choice are both key to the realisation of the Union's undergirding democratic values and freedoms. 102 The significance of economic plurality transcends the market economy and may be normatively connected to the broader concern of ensuring a healthy political process, unimpaired by distortions induced by powerful firms. 103 As such, the preservation of economic freedom has been viewed as creating the preconditions for democracy, safeguarding against political and regulatory capture. 104 Indeed, influence, lobbying and capture, so the argument goes, are subject to economies of scale and scope, both of which intensify as market concentration increases. 105 While EU law does not target economic power, nor the political power of large corporations, a competitive landscape helps safeguard the market for ideas against its monopolisation by powerful economic players.
Similar to the consideration of fairness as an abstract norm, these values would not likely serve as standalone intervention benchmark, yet they embody the European ethos and form part of its moral core. 109 Advanced manipulation through filtering and ordering may remain largely undetected. 110 Also illustrative are means used to increase usage of networks and applications through behavioural manipulation. 111 In an environment increasingly dominated by a handful of leading online gatekeepers, the exercise of power over the design and functionality of the user interface may affect user freedom and perception. Against this backdrop, the ever-old challenge of identifying the point at which such distortions may call for intervention or be treated as abuse of dominant position remains.
Market integration
EU competition law is instrumental in achieving the goal of integrating national markets. 112 The Commission has alluded to the economic benefits flowing from market integration, 'since the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers.'
113 Market integration considerations naturally affect the scope of illegality and the approach to horizontal and vertical agreements. They draw attention to possible segmentation of the EU-wide market into national monopolies. 114 The Court has held that 'an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the Treaty's objective of achieving the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single market.' 115 In a similar vein, in its pay-TV decision, the European Commission criticised as anticompetitive by object agreements which prohibit or limit cross-border passive sales and grant absolute territorial exclusivity: Market integration can be seen through the prism of consumer welfare, as parallel trade is liable to exert pressure on prices, while, on the other hand, the segregation of markets may result in reduced competitive pressure.
118 While the European Courts and the Commission have alluded to the economic nature of market integration, the protection of the internal market may naturally affect the threshold for intervention. 119 This may be noticeable in vertical agreements, licencing, 120 and online sales.
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In the context of the digital economy, market integration may, in particular, affect business strategies which limit the use of technology, interchangeability, online access, or freedom of online retailers, and, in doing so, create barriers between Member States. Such, for example, may be the case when:
o Contractual restrictions are used to prevent wholesalers and retailers from selling goods online, to buyers in other Member States.
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o Contractual obligations requiring permission for online sales from one Member State to another, are used to discourage exports and reinforce market partitioning.
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o Technological specifications are used to reduce or eliminate interchangeability between digital products for the purpose of geo-blocking.
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o Warranty restrictions are used to create a de facto separation between national markets and prevent parallel imports.
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o Online platforms implement geo-filtering; discriminatory practices aimed at charging different prices from users in different jurisdictions. ' [f]ollowing complaints from customers, the Commission is investigating agreements regarding hotel accommodation concluded between the largest European tour operators on the one hand (Kuoni, REWE, Thomas Cook, TUI) and hotels on the other hand (Meliá Hotels). The Commission welcomes hotels developing and introducing innovative pricing mechanisms to maximise room usage but hotels and tour operators cannot discriminate customers on the basis of their location. The agreements in question may contain clauses that discriminate between customers, based on their nationality or country of residence -as a result customers would not be able to see the full hotel availability or book hotel rooms at the best prices. ' o Dual pricing schemes are used to restrict competition between Member States.
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o Limitations on broadcasting and access to pay TV are implemented. 128 
III -Economics and Law
As evident from the multitude of goals and values explored, competition law forms an integral part of a polity's legal, social, and political fabric and 'cannot be pursued in isolation, as an end in itself, without reference to the legal, economic, political and social context.' 129 Inevitably, the pluralism of values described above, which underpins EU competition law, may create friction with economic theory to the extent that such theory supports a narrower analytical approach. Indeed, the interface between economics and law has been subjected to considerable public and academic debate. 130 In this regard, a broad consensus exists as to the crucial role that economics plays in shaping competition enforcement and intervention. 131 It is widely recognised that the centrality of economic analysis provides a valuable prism which helps ensure the compatibility of decision-making with the overall aims of competition. However, controversy remains as to the extent to which economisation may substitute legal norms and lead to the erosion of non-efficiency objectives. 132 On one hand, some have argued that economic theory should delimit the scope of competition enforcement. Accordingly, 'the only goal of antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare.' 133 While the concept of 'economic welfare' may carry differential weight, 134 this view of competition enforcement has often led to arguments favouring a narrow utilitarian approach that invariably marginalises other values. 135 Such approach discounts the (sometimes inconsistent) norms advanced in legislation and case law, viewing them as undesirable outcomes of political compromise which should be expunged from antitrust discourse. 136 Conversely, it vaunts the merits of quantifiable economics, as consistent and predictable benchmarks. According to this approach what counts is what is countable. Other values, even if forming part of the EU Treaty or case law, should be discounted at the level of implementation and enforcement.
By contrast, others take exception to the supposedly monolithic 137 and value-free nature of the economic enterprise. 138 They argue that one should not assume that current economic analysis is free of normative and political influence. A modern economic approach is not the result of inevitable higher powers or accurate science, but the outcome of evolution, and to some extent, selective cultivation driven by interest groups. 139 According to this view, economics in its current manifestation reflects an ideology, and as such embodies no superior analytical purity over other intervention benchmarks. Furthermore, economic models and theories of harm are often rooted in unrealistic assumptions.
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Consequently, economic theory should not eradicate the wider goals of EU competition law, nor should it strip it from its constitutional values and moral norms. The marginalisation of competition law's societal role, by means of economics, should be opposed. Use of the latter, so the argument goes, should be limited to: (i) assisting enforcers and courts in their assessments and interpretation of the law, (ii) reducing the risk of Type I and Type II errors, and (iii) safeguarding from protectionism or industrial interests.
Different competition agencies and scholars across Europe may well have different views on the optimal balance between law and economics, as well as on the latter's ability to fully reflect the goals and values of European competition law. This multitude of views is inevitable and not unique to Europe. It may be further subject to transformation as competition policy adjusts over time, constantly attempting to keep pace with new political and global realities, as well as with evolving economic and legal theory.
Importantly, however, as one sets to form her or his view on the optimal balancing point, one ought to remember that one's ideology, and any subsequent balancing, should take place within the legal framework set by the EU Treaties in accordance with their interpretation in case law. One should not eradicate the democratic foundations of a regime and replace them with technocratic control. This is so, in particular, when considering that the EU's current constitutional framework is the product of modern negotiation and design and provides a detailed account of the norms advanced by the legislator, and by extension, the people of Europe.
IV -International context
While competition laws around the world reflect large degrees of consensus on what competition law is set to achieve, they remain distinct, to the extent that they promote or place emphasis on a range of variegated values. The law and its interpretation are path dependant and rooted in ideology. Indeed, one needs only glance at the global arena to realise that different legal systems advance various goals suited to their respective economic, social and political realities and institutional frameworks. 141 Furthermore, one may observe differentiated views within jurisdictions as to the roles and values competition regimes should advance, as well as to the adequate scope of enforcement. Moreover, national differences in specific regulations, sector specific rules and exemptions, inevitably impact on the scope and mandate of competition law. 21 way convergence rather than a multi-directional journey and in doing so propagates a mirage of purity. 150 Understanding of the differences in design, law and values, calls for careful consideration before implanting or accepting intervention benchmarks and eradicating one's own norms and goals. Inevitably, differences in the scope of the law and its goals may impact on the outcome of enforcement actions. Take for example another recent statement from Delrahim, who signalled his comfort with mega mergers between high-tech firms and noted the 'great efficiencies' they deliver. 151 Undoubtedly, these comments reflect the scope of US antitrust law and current beliefs in the US as to the adequate level of intervention and the desired levels of concentration. 152 In the EU, one would certainly expect and demand these efficiencies to also play a role in merger review. They may indeed support consolidation, but importantly, under the EU regime, they may also be balanced against wider values and norms which form part of EU competition law.
The same principle would apply in other areas of competition law. For instance, while the approach toward monopolisation in the US and the abuse of dominant position in the EU share similarities, they may, at times, lead to different outcomes. Criticising inconsistent outcomes in abstract, with no regard to the different foundations and goals, is akin to comparing apples and oranges. 153 
IV -Concluding Remarks
This paper set out to clarify the scope of European Union competition law and to expound on the values and goals with which the discipline has been entrusted. In so doing, it pointed to the relevant contact points between competition law and the digital economy -identifying areas which may fall within its jurisdiction.
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, clarifying 'what is a competition law question?' under European Union law, leads to a multidimensional answer which reflects the multitude of values and goals of the European Union. The answer to this question feeds from the Treaties and their interpretation by the European Court and the Commission. It reflects a multitude of primarily interdependent and consistent goals which culminate in, but are not limited to, the protection of consumer welfare.
The European discipline, while evolving over the years, has displayed, overall, stable characteristics. The role and tasks entrusted to competition law have been set in the European Treaties since their inception and go beyond a pure efficiency analysis. They have been set within an analytical framework enshrined in provisions such as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which clarify their scope. On the other hand, by its nature, competition law evolves over time and so is the Court's and Commission's understanding of its scope. Inherent to the discipline is its evolutionary nature and the lack of sole permanent benchmarks for intervention.
As illustrated, the goals and values advanced by EU competition law provide for a flexible enforcement tool which can be used to address many of the evolving dynamics in digital markets. While many overlap in scope, it is possible to highlight their individual significance in the digital environment.
The consumer welfare benchmark may be used, among other things, to address welfare effects on multiple groups of customers and wealth distribution issues potentially stemming from the use of personal data and advanced analytics. It may capture both price and non-price variables. The latter may include, among other things, quality degradation.
The protection of effective competitive structure may be used, among other things, to address distorting practices, even when consumer effect is not readily present, to protect upstream providers, safeguard innovation in the digital economy, ensure access and consumer choice.
The protection of efficiencies may serve to limit enforcement actions in instances where a practice, agreement or transaction generates valuable innovation in digital markets. Conversely, it may call for intervention when innovation in the digital space is threatened.
Fairness may be used, among other things, as a guide to the nature of relations between online platforms, service providers and consumers. It may be used to target discriminatory practices by online providers, misleading information, exploitative data uses and wealth distribution.
Economic freedom, plurality and democracy may be relevant, among other things, in cases where online providers engage in manipulation, distort markets or information flows, and subsequently impact on plurality and consumers' freedom.
Market integration may be used, among other things, to address business strategies which limit the use of technology, interchangeability, online access, or freedom of online retailers, and, in doing so, create barriers between Member States. These goals may be wider than what some may favour. Furthermore, they may embed normative values and flexibility that run against the interests of some groups. Yet, that reality constitutes a reflection of both a unique constitutional process and the societal context in which they operate. This multitude should not be seen as an invitation for broad and unpredictable discretion. Furthermore, it does not preclude one from arguing in favour of limited intervention, or challenging the use of European competition law in different market settings. Such arguments may often have merit and contribute to the development of European jurisprudence.
The key issue lies in the understanding that these claims (on the desirability of intervention) must be apprehended within the framework of goals. Against this backdrop, one may indeed challenge the wisdom of intervention, the likely chilling effect it may have, or the possible utilisation of other instruments to achieve similar goals. One may, indeed, argue for different weighing of goals and values, challenge the choice of cases, theories of harm, standard of proof or evidence on which a decision is founded. One may, moreover, promote a 'more economic approach ', 154 or to the same extent, question whether economic analysis provides the ultimate prism through which enforcement of competition law is assessed. The content of this publication represents the views of the author only and it is his/her sole responsibility; it cannot be considered to reflect the views of the European Commission and/or the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency or any other body of the European Union. The European Commission and the Agency do not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.
